I. INTRODUCTION
Professional sports provide economists with opportunities to test theoretical predictions with a rich array of performance data. As the rules of the game are clearly defined for individual players as well as for organizations such as teams and leagues, sports statistics are often used to study rule changes and their consequences. Examples of such investigations include the effects of rookie draft rules on team competitive balance in Daly and Moore (1981) , Fort and Quirk (1995) and LaCroix and Kawaura (1999) , and free agency and the allocation of player talent in Eckard (2001) . This paper examines the effects of the designated hitter (DH) rule in professional baseball on team defensive strategies. The DH rule allows another player on the team roster to bat and run the bases in place of the pitcher, thereby ensuring that the pitcher does not have to bat. In North American Major League Baseball (MLB), the American League (AL) introduced the DH rule in 1973 and continues to use it, while the National League (NL) has never used the rule. Using MLB performance data, Goff, Shughart and Tollison (1997) , hereafter GST (1997) , found that AL batters were hit by pitches more frequently than their NL counterparts during DH-rule seasons. They attributed this difference to moral hazard by pitchers, arguing that pitchers in the DH-rule league can hit opposing batters of their choice with less concern for personal retaliation as the rule exempts them from facing opposing pitchers at the plate. 1 Trandel, White and Klein (1998), hereafter TWK (1998) , offered a new estimation equation to measure the DH's effects on hit-batsmen, updated the sample of GST (1997) by adding seven seasons (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) , and found that the DH's effect on hit-batsmen was statistically insignificant. TWK (1998) also questioned the moral hazard story by arguing that a pitcher merely acts as an agent of his team's manager and that retaliation is rarely directed at pitchers themselves. 2 They stressed that AL batters are on average better hitters as the DH rule replaces a weak-hitting pitcher with a big-hitting slugger and argued that pitchers have a lower opportunity cost of hitting sluggers than 1 Batters can, however, charge the pitcher on the mound, and opposing pitchers can also retaliate by hitting other players on the pitcher's team. Since the pitcher cannot bat, opposing team managers could order increases in these responses to limit dangerous brush-back pitches against their players.
2 In spite of the popular belief that retaliation is part of the game, researchers have been unable to identify statistically significant retaliatory responses. Trandel (2004) argued that retaliation should result in a positive correlation between the number of opposing batters hit by a team's pitchers and the number of hit-batsmen on the team. Using MLB team data, he found no evidence of statistically significant correlations between these two variables. Levitt (1998) also found no evidence that pitchers who frequently hit opposing batters are hit more often by opposing pitchers.
pitchers. The lower opportunity cost of hitting sluggers should lead to more hit-batsmen in the AL than the NL. In response to these criticisms, Tollison (1998), hereafter GST (1998) , acknowledged that the DH effect disappears when the sample period is extended through the 1997 baseball season. They hypothesized that the NL expansion in 1993 and the players' strike in 1994-95 may have diluted NL pitching and led to more hit batsmen in the NL, thereby diminishing the size and statistical significance of the DH effects in the AL. This paper has two objectives, the first of which is to contribute to the debate over the effects of the DH rule on hit-batsmen by using data from the two Japanese professional baseball leagues. As in North American MLB, one league in Japan-the Pacific League-introduced the DH rule in 1975 and continues to use it, while a second league-the Central League-has never used it. The parallel rule structures in Japan and North America allow empirical inquiry into the effects of the DH rule with a new data set, one which we believe is superior to the MLB data set. Unlike MLB, Japanese professional baseball did not have a major player strike during the The second objective of the paper is to provide regression-based tests of the various hypotheses offered to explain the increase in hit-batsmen under the DH rule. We find that the DH rule prompted a shift in team defensive strategy, which led to more aggressive pitching and more hit-batsmen. clause to the official rulebook prohibiting a pitcher from throwing "dangerous balls." 6 An umpire was given the authority to remove the pitcher or both the pitcher and his manager from the game when he judged that a pitcher had intentionally thrown at a batter. In the same year, the Pacific League adopted its own four-pronged guidelines providing umpires with more concrete guidance on how and under what circumstances to penalize pitchers and their managers for the occurrence of "dangerous balls". 7 We note that the timing of the 1982 and 1989 rules changes is roughly consistent with the timing of the declining gap in the HB rate during the DH period. After the issuance of the Pacific League "dangerous balls" memorandum in 1982, the gap between HB rates in the two leagues eventually disappeared over the course of the next seven seasons (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) 1975. The impact of the "dangerous balls" rule is also supported by the change in the mean difference of HB rates across leagues. The average difference in HB rates was 4.9 prior to the introduction of the DH rule (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) , which increased to 16.2 during the DH period before the dangerous ball rule was introduced (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) . 8 A t-test reveals that the difference in HB differentials across these two periods is statistically This applies even when the ball did not actually hit the batter; (2) when the ball hits the batter after players in the dugout have verbally instigated their team's pitcher to throw at batters, the pitcher and his manager should be immediately removed from the game. This applies even when the ball did not actually hit the batter, if the umpires judge that the pitcher has been engaged in dangerous pitching; (3) a warning is declared when a ball hits the batter on the head regardless of the umpires' judgment whether the pitch was intentional. After the warning, any pitcher who hits batters on the head should be immediately removed from the game; and (4) umpires have the authority to give warnings to any pitcher they judge to be engaged in dangerous pitching, in which case item (3) above applies. significant at the 1 percent level. After the dangerous ball regime is introduced (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , the mean differential in HB rates across the two leagues falls to -1.7 (with a 10.0 standard deviation). A t-test reveals that the mean differential in HB rates during the dangerous balls period (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) is not statistically different at the 5 percent level from the mean differential in HB rates during the pre-DH period. 9 We follow these simple difference in means tests with regression analyses designed to test both for the existence of changes in hit-batsmen across the three periods with different rules (no DH, DH, and DH with dangerous balls rule) and for the rationale underlying these changes in team behavior.
Effects of Designated Hitter Rule on Total Hit Batsmen
Our first set of regression analyses focuses on documenting changes in the annual number of hit batsmen in the two leagues over time. First, we replicate GST's (1997) original regression specification (1) using the 9 The t-statistic for the null hypothesis that there is no HB differentials between the pre-DH period (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) and DH period with no dangerous balls rule (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) ) is 2.929. The corresponding statistic for pre-DH period (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) and DH period with the dangerous balls rule (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) ) is 1.903; it is statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level but statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Dif-HBN t = β 0 + β 1 DH1 + β 2 DH2 + ε t .
OLS regression results with these specifications are presented in 10 We also run this analysis with DH2 specified to begin in 1983, which is the season after the Pacific League memorandum on dangerous balls was issued. The results are broadly similar. Table I . As in GST (1997) and TWK (1998), we correct for first-order autocorrelation. Specifications with a single DH dummy, (1) and (3), have low explanatory power (R 2 ) are statistically insignificant (F-statistic). In addition, estimated coefficients for the DH variable are not statistically different from zero at the 5 or 10 percent levels. These results do not support the proposition that the DH rule led to an increase in hit-batsmen.
Dividing the DH period into two, however, produced results in equations (2) and (4) that identify positive and statistically significant estimated coefficients for DH1 at the 5 percent level. This implies that the DH rule, before specific penalties for hitting batters were imposed on pitchers and their managers in 1989, was associated with an increase in the number of hit batsmen in the Pacific League.
It is possible that the observed impact of the DH on hit-batsmen is merely picking up the effect of the better batting lineup with the DH rule on the number of hit-batsmen. As TWK (1998) and Levitt (1998) point out, adoption of the DH rule allows a team manager to have a stronger batting line-up by replacing a weak-hitting pitcher in the batting line-up with a designated hitter with a high slugging average. Aggressive pitching to sluggers comes with the expected cost of an occasional hit batsman and with the expected gain of fewer big hits, due to the effects of brush-back pitches on the batter's concentration and stance at the plate. To the extent that a team manager chooses to order pitchers to engage in aggressive pitching more often to designated hitters than to pitchers, the number of hit batsmen should be greater with the DH rule.
To test the TWK hypothesis that introduction of the DH rule improves the batting line-up and hence leads to more hit-batsmen, we specify the following regressions and run them using aggregate league data and team data:
(5) HB t = β 0 + β 1 DH + β 2 PA t + β 3 SA t + ε t (6) HB t = β 0 + β 1 DH1 + β 2 DH2 + β 3 PA + β t 3 SA t + ε t where HB is hit-batsmen per season, PA is plate appearances, and SA corresponds to slugging average. SA is included in the specification to isolate the effects of batting line-up differences across seasons and teams. 11
League and team data are treated as panel data for the 1958-2004 seasons, 11 In order to identify the effect of the DH rule on batting performance, the number of bases is regressed on the DH dummy and at-bats for the Pacific League for seasons. The adjusted R-squared is 0.577, and the DH coefficient is 1144.09 with a t-statistic of 6.66. The size of the DH coefficient is 11.47% of the average number of bases during the pre-DH seasons (9973.29), which supports the hypothesis that the DH rule results in a better batting line-up. and regressions estimates are obtained using the fixed-effects framework.
Estimated coefficients for both league and team panel specifications are presented in Table II . The estimated coefficients on slugging average are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in both team and league regressions. While the estimated coefficients on the DH and DH2 dummies are not significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level, the estimated coefficient on the DH1 dummy is positive but statistically insignificant with league data and positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level with team data. These results reinforce our earlier results that the DH rule led to changes in the number of hit-batsmen until rule changes imposed larger penalties on managers and pitchers using "dangerous balls" strategies.
The league results also provide support for the TWK hypothesis but the more disaggregated team results show that the DH rule was an independent source of hit-batsmen even after the effect of a stronger line-up is taken into account in the regression.
III. THE DH RULE AND TEAM PITCHING STRATEGY
The preceding analyses demonstrate that the DH rule in the Pacific League was associated with more hit-batsmen and that a better batting line-up was responsible for some but not all of the increase. As GST (1997 GST ( , 1998 ) discussed, the additional effects of the DH rule on hit-batsmen could be due to pitchers who maximize their own (rather than team) utility by throwing at the batters of their choice. This is an explanation based on moral hazard by pitchers who no longer have to face retaliation at the plate. We are skeptical of this argument because the pitcher is under the direct supervision of his manager, who is watching every pitch and every play from the nearby team dugout. Since it is the manager who decided which players play and for how long, his pitching behavior should reflect his manager's defensive strategy in a game. A pitcher who pays attention to his own preferences rather than the manager's orders is likely to be penalized by the manager and team. While self-indulgent behavior can be found in any organization, we do not believe it is important in this context. We formulate the following scenario regarding the pitching strategy of a baseball team. Compare the strategies of managers of high-quality (winning) and low-quality (losing) teams: It is the manager of a losing team who is more tempted to use hit batsmen as a means of minimizing the damage incurred by opposing teams' sluggers. A winning team does not have to resort to this strategy as much as a losing team does, since it has a better group of pitchers and a stronger batting line-up. For a losing team, one obstacle to this strategy is that the team's pitchers may fear personal retaliation at the plate from the other team's pitchers. Managers pay attention to these concerns as they affect the ability of pitchers to carry out their assigned duties. Once the DH rule is adopted and pitchers can completely escape this particular form of retaliation, a losing team's manager finds it easier to instruct his pitchers to engage in aggressive pitching which includes brush-back and beanball pitches. 12 In order to test whether the DH rule prompted such a change in strategy, we conduct an analysis of the relationship between team performance and pitching strategy in the Pacific League. The proxy for the strategy is the "HB-ratio" that is the ratio of the number of hit batsmen a team's pitchers throw at other teams' batters to the number of hit batsmen 12 A beanball is a ball thrown at an opposing batter's head. It should be noted that the hypothesis of aggressive pitching by poorly performing teams under the DH rule rests on the potential of personal retaliation and does not require that retaliation actually takes place. The correlation coefficient between team pitcher-HBs and team batter-HBs (in terms of their divergence from league averages) for Japanese teams in 1958-2004 is -0.145, which does not provide evidence of retaliation. This is parallel to Trandel's (2004) findings from MLB data. its batters receive from other teams' pitchers. The more aggressive a team's pitching is, the greater this ratio becomes. The HB-ratio for Pacific League teams is regressed according to the following specification: (7) HB-ratio it = β 0 + β 1 WIN it + ε t where WIN it is team i's winning percentage in year t. Fixed-effects regression estimates are first obtained for periods before and after the adoption of the DH rule, and the DH period is further divided into two by the introduction of the penalties on "dangerous balls" in 1989.
As is demonstrated in Table III , there was no statistical relationship between team pitching strategy and team performance in the pre-DH period (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) 
IV. CONCLUSION
The results from our regression analyses of Japanese professional baseball league data show that the DH rule led to more hit batsmen until rule changes in 1989 prohibited pitchers from intentionally throwing dangerous pitches to a batter. It is notable that the impact of the DH rule can be isolated even after we control for the improved team batting line-ups in the Pacific League after the introduction of the DH rule. These new findings using Japanese data stand in contrast to TWK's (1998) findings using North American MLB data-that the increase in hit-batsmen in the American League is well within the range that would be observed due to improvements in the batting line-ups of AL teams.
Our result does not, however, necessarily lend support to the hypothesis that the increase in hit-batsmen in the Pacific League is due to moral hazard by pitchers. The DH rule also provided managers with a new tool to formulate their competitive strategies and may have altered managers' defensive strategies, particularly managers on losing teams with poor talent.
Economists have extensively studied North American professional baseball partly due to an intrinsic interest in the sport and partly due to the massive array of team and player performance data that are publicly available for analysis. In contrast, Japanese professional baseball has been largely ignored by economists. 13 This is unfortunate, as the massive and comprehensive data compiled for Japanese baseball players and teams could provide economists with a rare natural experiment that could provide insights into how robust the findings using U.S. data are. In this paper we have shed new light on the DH rule debate with Japanese data and have identified an alternative explanation that has been considered in the literature using U.S. data. 
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